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CASE COMMitENTS

Usually no trust was mentioned or contemplated.V ' The reason for
such strained reasoning is that in England a party can not recover on
a contract made for his benefit if he is not a party to the contract, and
the courts frequently torture such cases into trusts to avoid a harsh
result.' The admission of these facts by the English Courts is indicated by the fact that later cases renounce the trust theory."
The test whether there is a trust or a third party beneficiary
contract would seem to be whether the payee is to collect the money
under a duty as trustee and pay the proceeds to a third person, while
performing all the other duties of a trustee; or whether the third
person can collect the money.' The other duties of a trustee would
be to keep the trust money separate from his own"' and care for it for
the benefit of the beneficiary.'
This would not make the beneficiaries in circumstances similar to the Luce case cestuis of a trust,
as it might seem at first glance, for the parent or guardian acts for
them in collecting the money and any action brought is treated as
that of the child.
It is submitted that the Luce case is wrong and conflicts moreover with the weight of authority. This is an ordinary case of a
third party beneficiary which is sometimes confused with a trust.
E. R. WEBB

THE BREACH OF A PENAL STATUTE WHICH HAS FOR ITS
PURPOSE THE PROTECTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL
MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC AS
EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE
A recent California case' raises a matter which has caused a
great deal of disagreement and uncertainty among the different
courts in the field of Torts. Plaintiff was driving her car and
attempted to make a left turn. Defendant's street car approached
at a speed in excess of the maximum speed provided for by statute
and collided with the car. The opinion in deciding for the plaintiff said:
"If the jury believed that the defendant, Sherman was
traveling at a rate of speed in excess of 15 miles an hour,-and
according to his own testimony he was so traveling-the
defendant's negligence was established. The violation of an
ordinance or statute is negligence per se."
" Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons (1930) 46
Law Quarterly Review 12, 17; Note (1932) 81 A. L. R. 1271, 1272.
1 Scott, The Law of Trusts (1939) sec. 14.4.
"Vandepitte v. Preferred Accident Insurance Corporation (P. C.
1933) A. C. 70, 77; In re Rotherham Alum and Chemical Co., 25 Ch.
Div. 103, 111 (1883); In re Empress Engineering Co., 16 Ch. Div. 125,
127 (1880); West v. Houghton, L. R. 4 C. P. 197 (1879). Colyear v.
Mulgrave, 2 Keen, 81 (Rolls Court 1836), 48 English Report 559; 2
Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 360.
"1 Scott, The Law of Trusts (1939) sec. 14.2.
"Ibid.
"Ibid. and sec. 14.
'93 Pac. (2) 135 (1939).

K. L. J.-9
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The question presented here which it is our purpose to discuss
is what weight does the breach of a penal statute which has for its
purpose the protection of the individual members of the general
public have as evidence in determining the negligence of the defendant. Is such a breach conclusive evidence of negligence, prima facie
evidence of negligence, or mere evidence of negligence? A discussion of these three questions should clarify the role played by penal
statutes and their violation in regard to negligence.2 Breach of a
municipal ordinance is usually treated in the same way a breach
of a penal statute is treated in the different jurisdictions
I
NEGLIGENCE PER SE

If the breach of a penal statute which has for its purpose the
protection of the individual members of the general public is termed
conclusive evidence of negligence it is negligence per se. By negligence per se is meant negligence which a court can determine to be
negligence without submitting the question to the jury.
The case of Teche Lines v. Bateman4 illustrates the situation
where the breach of a penal statute is so considered. Here the statute forbade the operation of a vehicle on the open highway at a
greater speed than forty miles per hour. The plaintiff while riding
with her husband was struck in the eye by a rock thrown by defendants bus. The bus was operating at a speed in excess of the statutory limit and the court held that, "Where the violation of a specific
No attempt will be made in this discussion to present the view
that the breach of a statute is no negligence but is the breach of a
legal duty which is to be distinguished from the legal duty set up
by the common law. This view is best illustrated by the New
Hampshire case of Frost v. Stephens, 88 N. H. 164, 184 Atl. 869 (1936)
which says: "Causal violation of a statute is a legal fault. So also
is causal violation of the common law standard of due care. Both
are legal faults, but only the latter is negligence. There is no corresponding term for the violation of a statutory standard of conduct.
The term legal fault includes both violations, the term negligence
does not. It follows that, strictly speaking, the term negligence
should be used only to refer to that sort of legal fault which consists of violation of the common law standard."
'Sharick v. Galloway et al., -, 66 Pac. (2d) 187 (1937);
Davis v. Hopkins, 50 Ga. App. 654, 179 S. E. 213 (1935); Union Traction Co. of Indiana v. Wynkoop, 90 Ind. App. 331, 154 N. E. 40
(1926); James v. Carolina Coach Co., 207 N. C. 742, 178 S. E. 607
(1935); Stearns v. Williams, 12 Tenn. App. 427 (1930); Geer v. Gellerman, 165 Wash. 10, 4 Pac. (2d) 641 (1932). However, Michigan
treats the breach of statute as negligence per se and refuses to treat
an ordinance the same way. Rotter v. Detroit United R. Co., 205
Mich. 212, 171 N. W. 514 (1919). And an old Kentucky case which
has never been overruled, expressly, says that an ordinance can not
be negligence per se. Louisville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Dalton, 102 Ky.
290, 43 S. W. 431 (1897).
' 162 Miss. 404, 139 So. 159 (1932).

CASE COMMENTS

statute causes injury, and where such injury can reasonably be anticipated, or some injury can be anticipated, from such violation,
liability for the injury accrues."
A great majority of the courts follow the rule laid down in this
case, that the breach of a penal statute which has for its purpose the
protection of the individual members of the general public is negligence per se0 The effect of such a rule is that when the defendant
breaches a penal statute of this nature, he is guilty of negligence.
In reaching this result the courts have recognized the standard
established by the legislature and have accorded it their strongest
method of enforcement.
The decisions in Kentucky are in accord with the majority
view which says that violation of penal statutes which have for
their purpose the protection of the individual members of the general public is negligence per se.1 In addition to the decisions holding the violation of such statutes to be negligence per se, there is a
statute7 which provides:
"A person injured by the violation of any statute may
recover from the offender such damage as he may sustain by
reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture for
such violation be thereby imposed."
'Frazier et al. v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 28 Fed. Supp. 20
(Idaho 1939); Newell Contracting Co. v. Berry, 223 Ala. 111, 134 So.
868 (1931); Wright v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., et al., - Cal. -, 93
Pac. (2d) 135 (1939); Lewis v. City of Miami, 127 Fla. 426, 173 So.
150 (1937); Bozeman v. Blue's Truck Line, Inc., et al., - Ga. -,
7 S. E. (2d) 412 (1940); Carron et ux. v. Guido, 54 Idaho 494, 33 Pac.
(2d) 345 (1934); Union Traction Co. of Indiana v. Wynkoop, 90 Ind.
App. 331, 154 N. E. 40 (1926); Smith v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., Iowa -, 291 N. W. 417 (1940); Smith v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co.,
- La. -, 189 So. 316 (1939); Holmes v. Merson et al., 285 Mich. 136,
280 N. W. 139 (1938); Kuba et al. v. Nagel et al., -

Mo. -, 124

S. W. (2d) 597 (1939); Daly v. Swift & Co., 90 Mont. 52, 300 Pac.
265 (1931); White v. North Carolina R. Co., 216 N. C. 79, 3 S.E. (2d)
310 (1939); George v. Odenthal, 58 N. D. 209, 225 N. W. 323 (1929);
Patton v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 136 Ohio St. 159, 24 N. E. (2d) 597
(1939); Champlin Refining Co. v. Cooper, 184 Okl. 196, 86 Pac. (2d)
61 (1933); Sullivan v. Mountain States Power Co., 139 Or. 282, 9
Pac (2d P. 1038 1932); Locklear v. Southeastern Stages, Inc., et al., S. C. -,

3 S. E. (2d) 321 (1940); Glassman v. Feldman, -

Tex. -,

106 S.W. (2d) 721 (1937); Skerl v. Willow Creek Coal Co., 92 Utah
474, 69 Pac. (2d) 502 (1937); Fairchild et ux. v. Dean, Greeley et ux.
v. Same, 193 Wash. 1, 86 Pac. (2d) 271 (1939).
1 National Casket Co. v. Powar, 137 Ky. 156, 125 S. W. 279
(1910); Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Yeiser, 141 Ky. 15, 131 S.W.
1049 (1910); Collett's Guardian v. Standard Oil Co., 186 Ky. 142, 216
S. W. 056 (1919); Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Union Transfer
& Storage Co., 205 Ky. 651, 266 S. W. 362 (1924); Pryor's Adm'r v.
Otter, 268 Ky. 602, 105 S.W. (2d) 564 (1937).
7
Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, (Baldwin's 1936 Revision) sec.
466.
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Cited under this statute is the case of Turner v. Taylor's Adm'x'
in which the administratrix sought recovery for deaths alleged to
have resulted from failure of the defendants to provide fire escapes
as required by statute'
In this case the court said in its opinion:
"The cause of action is bottomed only upon the violation of
the statutes, supra, in connection with section 466 of the same
Edition of the statutes, which latter gives a cause of action for the
recovery of damages for injuries resulting from the violation of a
statute. But neither of the statutes, nor any one within this
jurisdiction, nor any declared principle of law by any court, take
away from or deprive a defendant in any such action of the right
to rely on the well-recognized and fundamentally established
defenses to actions based on negligence, two of which are: (a)
That notwithstanding the negligence of defendant, before he can
be made liable therefor his negligence must be the proximate
cause of the injury for which recovery is sought, and (b) that
notwithstanding his negligence he is yet exonerated if the injured
person's negligence contributed to his injury and but for which
it would not have happened."
The language of the court indicates the action is based on the
breach of the legal duty established by statute, and that this breach
is negligence. By expressing the view that the breach of the statutory duty is negligence the court is in acccord with the Restatement."
II
PwImA FACIE EVIDENCE Or NEGLIGENCE

If the violation of a penal statute which has for its purpose the
protection of individual members of the general public raises the presumption that the defendant has been negligent and places a burden
on the defendant to overcome this presumption, it is what is termed
prima facie evidence of negligence.
The case of Nadeau v. PerkinsP points out the manner in which
a court may call such a breach prima facie evidence of negligence.
In this case the driver in the automobile in which the plaintiff was
riding struck the defendant's truck which was parked on a highway
at night without lights. Such parking was prohibited by statute.
In allowing recovery the court said:
"The Legislature, through the enactment of statutes, prescribes rules designed to safeguard travelers, and provides penalties for violation of such rules. If such violation is admitted, or
proven by the evidence, it is prima facie evidence of negligence,
as it is sometimes said, and as otherwise expressed, raises a presumption of negligence. While not conclusive, the defendant
must overcome the presumption against him."
8262 Ky. 304, 90 S. W. (2d) 73 (1936).
*While the statute which has been breached in this case is not
precisely of the type this paper is attempting to discuss, the case
presents an interpretation of Sec. 466 of the Statutes, footnote 7,
supra, and this interpretation would be applicable to a penal statute
of the nature discussed in this paper.
"Restatement, Torts (1934) Sec. 282, Sec. 290 Comment (b).
- Me. -, 193 Atl. 877 (1937).

CASE CO3-ENTS
A very small minority of the courts follow the rule laid down in
the above case that the breach of a penal statute which has for its
purpose the protection of the individual members of the general pubm
lic is prima facie evidence of negligence.
' A presumption of negligence is raised against a defendant who breaches such a penal
statute in the jurisdictions following the rule of prima facie evidence
of negligence. Just as in ordinary cases of negligence based on the
common law standard of the reasonably prudent man, such presumption of negligence may be overcome by the introduction of sufficient
evidence to show that the defendant was not in fact negligent. Thus,
while under the rule that the breach of a penal statute which has for
its purpose the protection of the individual members of the general
public is prima facie evidence of negligence the burden of going forward with the proof is shifted, it is not conclusively presumed that
the defendant is negligent. Here, the court in effect gives strong
recognition and support to the standard established by the legislature,
but does not take the standard as conclusive of the conduct of a
reasonably prudent man.
III
MERE EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE
If the violation of a penal statute which has for its purpose the
protection of individual members of the general public is treated
merely as evidence of the defendant's negligence, it is termed mere
evidence of negligence.
The case of Gill v. Whiteside-Hemby Drug Company" is an
example of a particular instance where the court treated the violation of such a penal statute as mere evidence of negligence. In this
case the defendant's employee was driving a motorcycle and passed
a street car at an intersection in violation of a statute, striking the
plaintiff. The plaintiff contends that the violation of the statute conclusively makes the defendant liable for negligence. The court in
affirming the decision for the defendant said:
"We have frequently held that violation of a state law, or
violation of a city ordinance, is merely evidence of negligence,
and does not constitute negligence per se."
This court, in holding that the violation of a penal statute which
has for its purpose the protection of the individual members of the
general public is mere evidence of negligence, does not give much
recognition to the standard established by the legislature. In many
cases such conduct as would breach one of these penal statutes would
constitute some evidence of negligence regardless of whether there
were a statute or not.
A small number of jurisdictions say that the violation of a penal
statute of the nature referred to above is evidence of negligence.'
" Elliott v. Montgomery, - Me. -, 197 Atl. 322 (1938); State to
Use of Schiller v. Hecht Co., 165 Md. 415, 169 Atl. 311 (1933); Wold
v. Gardner et al., 167 Wash. 191, 8 Pac. (2d) 975 (1932).
- Ill. App. -, 26 N. E. (2d) 433 (1940).
"Gaw Construction Co., - Mass. -, 15 N. E. (2d) 225 (1938);
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Even though these cases say the violation of a penal statute is evidence of negligence, the result reached is the same as that reached
by the cases holding such breach to be negligence per se.
Three methods of treating the breach of a penal statute which
has for its purpose the protection of the individual members of the
general public as evidence of negligence have been presented. The
breach has been treated as mere evidence of negligence and no great
weight given to the statutory standard. It has been treated as
prima facie evidence creating a presumption of negligence on the
part of the defendant. And it has been treated as negligence per se,
making the defendant's negligence absolute. Which of these three
methods will best accomplish the purpose of the statutes and at the
same time deal justly with the parties?
It is submitted that, if the breach of penal statutes which have
for their purpose the protection of the individual members of the
general public, is treated as negligence per se by all the courts
instead of a majority of them, the social end for which the statutes
were passed will be substantially and justifiably implemented.
The rule that breach of such penal statutes is negligence per se,
or as a matter of law, does not necessarily render the defendant liable
in every case where he breaches a statute. But where the plaintiff
relies on the breach of a penal statute, to recover he must prove, (1)
that the statute was intended to protect him as an individual;' (2)
that the interest invaded is the interest the act intended to protect;"
7
(3) that the violation is the legal or proximate cause of his injury;
and the defendant may prove contributory negligence to defeat the
claim of the plaintiff.
Thus, we see that while the violation of penal statutes which
have for their purpose the protection of the individual members of
the general public, if treated as negligence per se, would make the
negligence of the defendant conclusive, the defendant would not be
liable every time a statute of this nature was violated. Therefore,
while the social end of protection of the public would thus be attained,
the defendant in such a negligence action would not be dealt with
GLENN DENHAM
unjustly.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-CONCLUSION OF INDICTMENT
' The defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter under
an indictment which did not conclude "against the peace and dignity
of the Commonwealth of Kentucky", as required by Kentucky Constitution, Section 123. No demurrer was made to the indictment
Weimer et al. v. Westmoreland Water Co., - Pa. -, 193 Atl. 665
(1937).
'Falk v. Finkelman, 268 Mass. 89, 168 N. E. 89 (1929).
"8 Dunbar v. Olivieri, 97 Colo. 381, 50 Pac. (2d) 64 (1935).
158 So. 408
La. -,
'Hataway
v. F. Strauss & Son, Inc., (1935).
8
" Patton v. Pa. R. Co., 136 Ohio St. 159, 24 N. E. (2d) 597 (1939).
'Kentucky Constitution Sec. 123: "The style of process shall be,
'The Commonwealth of Kentucky.' All prosecutions shall be carried

